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Abstract 
 
The unity of the virtues in Aristotle, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and in the Byzantine commentators 
 
Aristotle’s argument in Nicomachean Ethics 6 for the mutual implication of the virtues by one another is developed, 
and others added to it, in a repertory of arguments for this thesis in section 18 of the De anima libri mantissa 
(Supplement to the Book On the Soul) attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. The last part of this is echoed in no.22 
of the Ethical Problems attributed to Alexander; nos. 8 and 28 of the same collection are also relevant. A distinction 
can be drawn between the mutual implication of the virtues and the unity of virtue in some stronger sense; the 
arguments in the texts attributed to Alexander are examined to see whether they imply the latter more clearly than 
Aristotle’s own argument does, and the conclusion is drawn that some do so because of the use they make of the 
conception of the noble as the goal of virtuous action, or of virtue as a whole of parts. The treatment of Aristotle’s 
argument in the Byzantine commentaries is characterised by a preoccupation with the special status of practical 
wisdom. 
 
  
1. That the virtues in some sense form a unity was a thesis apparently maintained 
by the historical Socrates (1). It plays a part in the aporia at the end of the Laches, 
and is the theme of the major part of the Protagoras. In a fundamental article (2) 
Gregory Vlastos distinguished between the unity of the virtues and their 
"biconditionality", the claim that the possession of any one virtue implied the 
possession of any other, so that the possession of one implies the possession of all. 
And he further distinguished two ways of understanding the unity of the virtues. If 
that thesis is understood in the strongest sense (1), the words for the different 
virtues — in the Protagoras, wisdom, temperance, justice, piety and courage, 
though from the Republic on piety is dropped from what became the canonical list 
of the cardinal virtues — all in fact have the same meaning, so that the use of 
different words simply reflects a failure to appreciate the facts of the case. To this 
Vlastos contrasted the view which he argued most accurately captures the position 
of Plato’s Socrates in the Protagoras, that (2) the words for the different virtues do 
indeed apply to a single underlying reality, in such a way that they may all 
correctly be applied to every instance of virtuous action, but particular instances 
can nevertheless be most properly named with reference to one particular virtue, so 
that, while all courageous acts are also just, and vice versa, nevertheless actions 
that primarily display courage can meaningfully be distinguished from actions that 
primarily display justice. In the present discussion I shall reserve the label (3) for 
"biconditionality", which I shall refer to as "the mutual implication of the virtues" 
and understand as the claim that, while each virtue is a different thing or property, 
as a matter of contingent, though no doubt explicable fact no-one can possess some 
of them without possessing the others. 
Aristotle discusses the mutual implication of the virtues in the final chapter of 
Nicomachean Ethics 6 = Eudemian Ethics 5. He there draws a distinction between 
natural virtue (phusike arete) and virtue proper (kuria arete), the former being that 
possessed by animals and children as well as by human adults (1144b1-12); natural 
virtue becomes true virtue by the addition of intelligence (nous) or practical 
wisdom (phronesis) (12-17), so that while Socrates was wrong to think — in 
Aristotle’s interpretation — that the virtues are instances of practical wisdom (3), 
he was right in that virtue proper cannot exist without practical wisdom (17-30). 
Being good in the proper sense therefore requires practical wisdom, and having 
practical wisdom implies having moral virtue (ethike arete) (30-32) (4). 
The mutual implication of the virtues is not yet explicit, though the reference to 
moral virtue in the singular in 1144b32 could be seen as implying it (and indeed as 
implying more, unity in sense (2)). But Aristotle then goes on to say that this 
makes it possible to answer the dialectical argument that the virtues can be 
separated from one another because no-one is equally well endowed by nature in 
respect of all of them, and therefore some of them will be possessed before others. 
This, Aristotle argues, applies to the natural virtues, but not to those in respect of 
which a person is called good without qualification. For the presence of practical 
wisdom, which is single, will involve the presence of all the virtues (plural) of the 
latter type (1144b32-1145a2) (5). (Exactly what the range of virtues is to which 
this applies, and how indeed virtues are to be individuated, has been the subject of 
a debate between Irwin and Kraut, focussing particularly on the issue of the "large-
scale" virtues such as magnificence and magnanimity (6); but that issue can be left 
aside for our present purpose.) 
Aristotle continues by commenting that, even if practical wisdom were not 
involved in action, it would be needed as being a virtue in its own right (1145a2-4). 
The status of practical wisdom as both being one of the virtues itself and having a 
special relationship to the others will concern us later in this discussion. He then, 
notoriously, remarks that right choice involves both practical wisdom and virtue, 
because "one makes (us have) the goal, the other (makes us) do what leads to the 
goal" (1145a4-6) (7); although the latter point is not formally in Aristotle part of an 
argument for the unity of the virtues, I mention it here because we will see it being 
taken up in the arguments I will go on to discuss. 
The interpretation of Aristotle’s argument has been the subject of much debate in 
recent scholarship (8). There is therefore a particular interest in seeing what ancient 
interpreters made of it, and where they anticipated points made in more recent 
discussion, especially since, as Halper remarks, "this unity of virtue doctrine is 
surprising because it seems contrary to common sense, to Aristotle’s own analysis 
of the individual virtues, and to his general anti-Platonic stance." (9) 
  
  
2. The text transmitted as the second book of the treatise On the Soul by the 
Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second/early third 
century A.D.), but labelled mantissa or "supplement" by its most recent editor, is in 
fact a collection of texts on various topics and by different authors (who may well 
include Alexander himself for some of the texts), though connected with the works 
certainly attributed to Alexander both by their themes and by their generally 
Aristotelian character (10). A considerable number of these texts take the form of 
batteries of arguments for a particular thesis, each successive argument being 
introduced by eti, "moreover". And one among these is a group of arguments 
(section 18 of the mantissa, pp.153-156 Bruns) for the thesis of the mutual 
implication of the virtues, hoti antakolouthousin hai aretai. (The term 
antakolouthein is Stoic, as Pohlenz pointed out.) (11). A section of the Ethical 
Problems, another collection of texts attributed to Alexander but probably rather to 
be taken as evidence for the activity of Alexander himself and his school, bears the 
same title and advances arguments which are similar to some of those in the 
mantissa collection. And two further sections of the Ethical Problems are 
concerned with the question whether virtue is related to the particular virtues as a 
genus to its species or as a whole to its parts. 
  
  
3. The arguments in section 18 of the mantissa are not numbered in our primary 
MS, Venetus Marcianus gr. 258, simply distinguished by paragraph marks; but I 
will number them here to facilitate discussion (12). Argument (I) is a series of 
examples from experience, invoked to show that the lack of one virtue will hinder 
the practice of the others; the coward will not act justly when deterred by a 
frightening threat, and the unjust man will not be temperate but "will give himself 
the advantage in pleasant things too" (153.29-154.17). (The first of these examples 
seems more convincing than the second.) (13). This is followed by (II) an argument 
from linguistic usage: craftsmen are called "good" with the addition of a reference 
to the craft, as in the case of a "good carpenter", but a virtuous person is called 
"good" without qualification, and one who is good without qualification cannot be 
good in some respects but not in others; therefore one cannot possess one virtue 
and not the others (154.17-23). To this one might object that a man who is 
courageous but unjust can be called "a good fighter". One might respond that in 
such a case "good" would be applied in respect of the skill rather than the virtue; 
but Aristotle does at EN 6 1144b35-1145a1 say that "good without qualification" 
applies in respect of virtue proper as opposed to the natural virtues. 
It is then claimed (III) that the same argument applies to vice as well: a person who 
is vicious is bad without qualification (rather than "a bad carpenter", for example), 
and so he cannot simultaneously be good without qualification. Consequently a 
person who possesses any vice cannot possess virtue (154.23-26). There are two 
difficulties here. First, the claim that a person who is vicious is bad without 
qualification seems tendentious: we are perfectly ready to call a person bad 
because he is unjust without requiring him to be cowardly as well. It looks rather 
as if the author of the argument has assumed what he is setting out to prove, for it 
is only if we assume that virtue or vice is an all-or-nothing matter — that it is 
impossible to possess simultaneously some vices and some virtues — that we will 
be inclined to say that a person who is bad is bad without qualification.  
Second, the argument claims more than it needs to, and thus, paradoxically, 
weakens its own conclusion. Having established, however dubiously, that a bad 
person is bad without qualification, all the author needs to do is to infer from this 
that such a person cannot be good even in a qualified sense, and hence cannot 
possess any of the virtues: being bad absolutely excludes being good even in a 
single respect. Instead of that we get the claim that such a person cannot be good 
without qualification, which implies that he or she cannot possess complete virtue. 
What we need, however, is the claim that such a person cannot possess any virtue.  
To be sure, in the previous argument "being good without qualification" was 
equated not with possessing complete virtue, but just with possessing virtue; and 
perhaps in the present argument too we should take "bad without qualification" not 
to mean "bad in respect of all the virtues as opposed to just some", but rather to 
exclude badness in respect of a craft, for example. For then it does not follow that 
being bad absolutely excludes being good in a particular respect; a vicious person 
can be a good carpenter. But in that case what the argument has effectively done is, 
by connecting the possibility of qualifications only with non-moral applications of 
"good" and "bad", to exclude the possibility of qualifying the moral applications, 
so that we cannot say that a person is good in respect of courage but bad in respect 
of justice. And once again, the most likely reason for taking such a position is that 
one is treating virtue as an all-or-nothing matter, in other words assuming what the 
argument is meant to be setting out to prove. 
Argument (IV) at 154.26-30, similarly starts from vice. First the author claims that 
(4) the vices do not imply one another, because some consist in excess and some in 
deficiency. (The conflict with the preceding argument, which, if read in the first of 
the two ways indicated, implied that to be bad was to be bad with all the vices, is 
only apparent: "bad with all the vices" needs to be read in the sense of "lacking all 
the virtues" rather than of "possessing all vices, even mutually incompatible and 
opposed ones" (14). But perhaps this strengthens the case for reading the argument 
in the second way, so that the possibility of a qualified sense of "bad" does not 
relate to the possession of particular vices, but not others.) Then, from the claim 
that (4) the vices do not imply one another, and the further claim that (5) "vice is 
sufficient for unhappiness", it is inferred that (6) just one vice is sufficient for 
unhappiness. The author then asks rhetorically "how is it possible to say that a man 
who is unhappy possesses any virtue?": in other words (7) unhappiness is 
incompatible with the possession of even one virtue, and so, from (6) and (7), (8) 
just one vice excludes the possibility of any virtue (15). 
(7) is a remarkably strong claim. The sufficiency of virtue for happiness was a 
Stoic rather than a Peripatetic thesis (everyone, at least in philosophical circles, 
agreed about the necessity of virtue for happiness); but what we have in (7) is not 
just the claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, but the even stronger claim that 
just one virtue is sufficient for happiness. The Stoics would indeed have accepted 
this, but they would have accepted it only because they accepted the unity of the 
virtues. 
There is also a problem concerning the relevance of (4) to the inference from (5) to 
(6). (4) would indeed licence the claim that (5) cannot be interpreted as meaning 
that all vices are needed for unhappiness; for (4) shows that the possession of all 
vices is impossible. Unfortunately, though, (4) does not show this in a way that is 
relevant to the point at issue. For (4) excludes the suggestion that, for example, one 
needs to be both foolhardy and cowardly to be unhappy. But surely what is at issue 
in the debate about the unity of the virtues is whether one can be, for example, just 
but cowardly. If (6), together with (7), is to licence a claim that this is not possible, 
(6) must have the sense that cowardice is sufficient for unhappiness even if one is 
just. What is needed, then, is an argument that one does not need to be both unjust 
and cowardly to be unhappy; and on that (4) appears to have no bearing. Moreover, 
even apart from this point, (4) does not support the inference in (6) that a single 
vice is sufficient for unhappiness; if (4) rests on the point that vices come in 
mutually exclusive pairs, as it were, the most it can do is to show that for 
unhappiness one needs not all the vices, but only half of them. — True, (4) is 
actually stated in the form "the vices do not imply one another – and how could 
they when they are opposite to one another, given that some consist in excess and 
some in deficiency?". It would be possible to read this so that the first clause 
indicates that every vice is independent of every other, and that gives us what we 
want to justify (6); but then the problem of relevance is simply shifted from (4) as 
a whole to its second part, the rhetorical question "and how could they ... and some 
in deficiency?" (16). 
  
  
4. Argument (V), at 154.30-155.6, turns on the claim that virtuous action is action 
for the sake of what is noble or fine (kalon) (17), and that what is noble is 
undifferentiated qua noble. Consequently a person who loves what is noble in 
courage, but not what is noble in justice, is not pursuing what is noble in courage 
qua noble. (The point can be captured by saying that such a person is not pursuing 
the noble as such.) Our author then makes the argument more precise by posing a 
dilemma: either this person does not know what is noble in justice, or he does but 
does not choose it. In the former case he cannot be said to know what is noble, for 
the knowledge of what is noble is single (here one might compare the argument in 
Plato’s Laches that knowledge of good and evil is the same for past, present and 
future, so that the definition of courage collapses into that of virtue as a whole: 
198d-199e), and in that case he cannot be pursuing what is noble even in courage. 
If on the other hand he does know what is noble in justice, but does not choose it, 
then he does not love what is noble, "for as the lover of wine has an affinity to 
every wine, so the lover of what is noble chooses and loves everything that is 
noble". Consequently even what he does choose is not chosen for the sake of what 
is noble. (To the latter horn of the dilemma it might be objected that a person might 
recognise that a certain course of action was noble but also hold that its price was 
too high in other terms (18); presumably, though, the question will then arise 
whether this judgement is one that a virtuous person would endorse. If it is, then 
the agent’s claim to possess the virtue of justice is not called in question: we do not 
say that a person who commits a minor injustice to save his own life, when acting 
under a threat for example, is an unjust person because he does not give the 
nobility of justice absolute priority. If on the other hand the choice is a wrong one, 
then we have a prima facie case for saying that the agent does indeed not know 
what is noble) (19). It may be noted that the present argument contradicts that for 
the possibility of alternative courses of action at Alexander, de fato 15 185.21-28 
(20); for it supposes that a person is only motivated by nobility if he is always 
motivated by nobility. It is also an argument for the unity of the virtues in sense (2) 
rather than just in sense (3); for the names of the different virtues name different 
aspects of the knowledge and love of what is noble. While Aristotle’s own 
argument at EN 6 1144b32-1145a2 requires that practical wisdom is a unity, and 
Aristotle holds that practical wisdom cannot exist without moral virtue which 
makes the end correct, this falls short of a claim that virtue is a unity (rather than a 
plurality of which each member implies the others) unless one adds the claim that 
the end is a unity as well, and that is what the present argument does. 
The next argument (VI) is that the virtues are concerned with different emotions 
but have a single goal in what is noble. Therefore the person who has a single 
virtue, possessing this goal, will do everything that he does for the sake of it, and 
thus he will possess all the virtues (155.6-13). This essentially repeats the 
(questionable?) claim in the previous argument that a person who is motivated by 
nobility at all will be motivated by it always; as such, it turns on a psychological 
point rather than the appeal to linguistic usage of arguments (II) and (III). 
  
  
  
5. Argument VII (155.13-31) claims that the individual virtues are so called as 
being parts of a single whole, though concerned with different subject-matters, and 
cannot exist in isolation, "except that we are in the habit of calling fitness (for 
various things), that is good natural endowments, virtues, applying the name only" 
(155.26-27). The reference here is probably to the "natural virtues" of Aristotle, EN 
6 (above, §I) (21); one might also think of the qualified senses of "good" in 
argument (II) in the present collection, but there the examples were drawn from the 
crafts and there was no reference to natural endowments (22). Nevertheless, the 
reference here to individual virtues as being virtues only "with addition" (meta 
prosthekes: so that, for example, courage would be "the virtue concerning fear and 
confidence") (155.23) echoes the use of the same phrase in argument (II) at 154.19 
(23).  
A person does not qualify as just on the basis of a single just action; similarly, it is 
claimed, one would not say a person possessed virtue because he acted for the sake 
of what is noble in connection with one particular subject-matter (e.g. in contexts 
where courage is called for) (155.28-31). The argument, it may be noted, again 
appeals to linguistic usage (24); it also supposes that it is possible to act for the 
sake of what is noble in some contexts but not in others, which arguments (V) and 
(VI) denied, but the distinction is only a verbal one, turning on what is or is not to 
be counted as action "for the sake of what is noble" even in an attenuated sense of 
that expression. The parts of a whole, in general, are parts only when they 
complete or make up (sumpleroun) the whole — otherwise they are parts only in 
name (homonumos); just so the individual virtues are only virtues when they are 
present in virtue as a whole (155.24-27) (25). Again, we have an argument for the 
unity of virtue in a stronger sense than (3), for virtue in any context requires the 
pursuit of what is noble in every context (155.29-31). 
Our argument begins, however, by linking individual virtues not just to different 
subject-matters (or areas of activity), but to different faculties of rational human 
soul. It begins by drawing the contrast found in Aristotle, EN 1 1102b13-1103a3, 
between the rational faculty proper and the faculty obedient to reason (155.16-17), 
and then claims that virtue (i.e. as a whole) is the highest point (akrotes) in each 
faculty (155.17-18) and that each individual virtue relates to a different faculty 
(155.20-21). It is not clear just how the different virtues are meant to map on to 
different faculties, or indeed that there are enough faculties to distinguish all the 
virtues. 
The theme of soul-faculties is developed further in the next argument (VIII, 
155.31-38), though not in a way that solves this particular problem. The author 
distinguishes between a reasoning part of the soul and an emotional (pathetikos) 
part; Alexander elsewhere applies this term to a part of the soul concerned with the 
ethical virtues and contrasted with the reasoning part (26). No explicit reference is 
indeed made in these passages to emotions or "passions" (pathe); but that virtue is 
concerned with actions and emotions is argued by Aristotle at EN 3 1104b13ff, and 
two passages from Arius Didymus apply pathetikon to the part of the soul which 
obeys the rational part and which (in the second passage) is receptive of virtue (27). 
Aristotle, EE 2.3 1221b17 refers to gluttons and drunkards having a pathetike 
dunamis to enjoy food and drink contrary to reason (28). 
Knowledge of what is good is the virtue of the rational part (29), doing it is the 
virtue of the emotional part, and neither can exist without the other; it is not 
"possible to know that good things are good if one does not choose them and have 
an inclination towards them" (155.34-35. This appears at first sight to be a denial 
of the possibility of akrasia, lack of self-control: one might argue that the akratic 
who knows what is good but fails to do it has an inclination but fails to act on it, 
but it seems harder to maintain that he chooses the course of action he fails to 
follow. But in fact, as argument (IX) will make clear, the solution is that the akratic 
does not know what is good, in the full sense of knowledge) (30). Consequently "it 
is not possible to possess the virtue of the reasoning (part) without (those of) the 
emotional" — which does indeed follow from the foregoing argument: the Greek 
is, as yet, neutral between "(those of)" and "(that of)", though the sequel implies 
the latter — "nor any of these (the plural is now explicit) apart from that and 
(apart) from each other". But at this point we may surely ask: even if common 
usage suggests that there are several other virtues apart from practical wisdom, and 
even if, where only two relevant faculties of soul are distinguished, all the other 
virtues must be assigned to a single, emotional, faculty, what ground has been 
given by this specific argument for supposing that one cannot have, for example, 
justice without courage or courage without justice? (31). To be sure, this could be 
claimed if we import from argument (V) the notion that the knowledge of what is 
noble in contexts calling for courage and in those calling for justice is an 
indivisible whole (32); but this just raises the question how far the individual 
arguments in the collection are intended to be self-contained. 
  
  
6. Argument (IX) (155.38-156.6) fills the gap in argument (VIII), by relating 
practical wisdom to the individual virtues. Knowing what is good belongs to 
practical wisdom, choosing what is good to the moral virtues, and practical 
wisdom and the moral virtues imply each other. Consequently, anyone who 
possesses a single moral virtue must possess practical wisdom, and thus will 
possess the other moral virtues as well. This is essentially Aristotle’s own 
argument at EN 6 1144b35-1145a2; it also repeats the point about knowledge of 
argument (IV), but now formulated in terms of practical wisdom rather than of the 
unified knowledge of all that is noble in action. Here however, by contrast with 
argument (VII), the possibility of akrasia is explicitly acknowledged: that knowing 
what is good implies choosing it "is why we say that the person who lacks self-
control does not have knowledge in the proper sense and without qualification" 
(156.1-2) (33). 
Argument (X) makes no reference to individual virtues at all. It is of interest 
chiefly because it echoes the passage in the text of Aristotle immediately following 
that reflected in argument (IX). Every action in accordance with virtue involves 
both having the right goal and acting in the right way; the former belongs to moral 
virtue, the latter to practical wisdom, and each implies the other. (156.6-10). From 
this we can indeed extract the argument that performing a single action virtuously 
involves possessing both moral virtue and practical wisdom; but to reach the 
conclusion that all actions will then be performed virtuously we will need either 
the claim that if one’s goal is nobility in one action it will be nobility in all actions, 
or the claim that if one knows what is noble in one context one will know what is 
noble in all contexts, or, indeed, both: cf. arguments (V) and (VI) above. 
Arguments (IX) and (X) are however developed further in argument (XI) (156.10-
27). Practical wisdom can only exist where there is also knowledge of the correct 
goal (otherwise, as Aristotle had argued at EN 6 1144a23-b1, it would merely be 
cleverness, deinotes), and practical wisdom is concerned with every possibility for 
action (prakton) (34). Therefore the possession of practical wisdom implies the 
knowledge of the correct goal in every possibility for action, and hence unites all 
the moral virtues with itself; and, since the possession of any one moral virtue 
implies the possession of practical wisdom, the possession of any one moral virtue 
implies the possession of all the others (35). 
Argument (XI) concludes with the comment "it is not easy, according to 
Theophrastus, to grasp the differences between the virtues in such a way that they 
do not have something in common between them; but they are named according to 
what predominates (in each)." (36) Presumably Theophrastus implied that you 
should not define the virtues in such a way that they have nothing in common. The 
formulation "they are named according to what predominates (in each)" could be 
seen as anticipating Vlastos’ interpretation of the unity of the virtues in sense (2). 
Stobaeus records an argument that the possessor of each ethical virtue has practical 
wisdom kata to idion, but the possessor of practical wisdom has the individual 
ethical virtues per accidens (37); whether this formulation goes back to 
Theophrastus is questionable (38). 
  
  
7. As already mentioned, the unity of the virtues is also the theme of three of the 
collection of Ethical Problems attributed to Alexander (39). Ethical Problem 22 
bears the same title, "that the virtues imply one another", as does section 18 of the 
mantissa; the titles of the pieces in these collections are probably not original (40), 
but in the case of Ethical Problem 22 the title is drawn from the opening sentence. 
This text is probably a fragment of a longer discussion, since it begins with "also" 
and since the ending seems grammatically incomplete (41). The points made are 
similar to arguments (X)-(XI) of mantissa 18, though the wording is different. 
The text begins by saying that the mutual implication of the moral virtues can be 
shown from choice. Right choice requires both practical wisdom and moral virtue, 
for the latter makes us pursue the end, because "one makes (us have) the goal, the 
other (makes us) do what leads to the goal": as in argument (X) of mantissa 18, 
this derives from Aristotle, EN 1145a5-6, though here the wording is identical to 
Aristotle’s, which it is not in the mantissa. And, as in argument (X) of mantissa 18, 
the text proceeds to another argument introduced by a "Moreover" before any 
conclusion about the mutual implication of the virtues has actually been drawn.  
Ethical Problem 22 then proceeds to claim, as in argument (XI) of mantissa 18, 
that possessing any moral virtue involves possessing practical wisdom, and that 
possessing practical wisdom involves possessing moral virtue, for otherwise it will 
be not practical wisdom but cleverness (42). The point that the possession of a 
single moral virtue involves practical wisdom is here made at the start of the 
argument (143.1), while in mantissa 18 it is postponed till 156.21. But the Ethical 
Problem fails, in the present state of the text, to make the point, crucial if a 
conclusion concerning the mutual implication of the virtues is to be drawn, that the 
possession of practical wisdom implies the possession of all the moral virtues. It 
does however make the point, absent from argument (XI) in the mantissa, that 
moral virtue is the virtue of the appetitive (orektike) faculty; one may compare 
argument (VIII) in the mantissa, but there the reference is to the emotional faculty 
rather than to the appetitive (43).  
  
  
8. Ethical Problems 8 and 28 present two different discussions of the same 
problem. One is naturally led to see them as, perhaps, two papers prepared for a 
single seminar; the temptation should perhaps be resisted (44). Virtue, it is argued 
in both texts, is not a genus with the particular virtues as its species, because the 
removal of one virtue implies the removal of both virtue in general and all the 
other particular virtues as well, which does not apply in the case of genera and 
their species (to supply an example, if the species "cat" ceased to exist it would not 
follow that "animal", "dog" and "horse" ceased to exist). This argument clearly 
presupposes the mutual implication of the virtues. In Problem 8, however, though 
not in Problem 28, the point is made that even if all the virtues do not mutually 
imply one another, the removal of one of them, practical wisdom, would involve 
the removal of virtue in general (and, by implication, of all the other virtues). On 
the other hand, it is argued in both texts, virtue cannot be a whole with the 
individual virtues as its parts, for then the definition of virtue as a whole would not 
apply to the individual virtues. 
Although the problem is stated in similar terms in both texts, the solutions are 
different. Problem 8 offers two. The first is to suggest that the virtues are related by 
what has come to be called "focal meaning" (aph’ henos or pros hen) (45), so that 
if what comes first is removed it takes with it both the things that follow it and 
what they have in common. The text does not explicitly state what the primary 
item is in the case of the virtues, but clearly it must be practical wisdom. As with 
arguments (VII) and (VIII) in mantissa 18, however, this solution seems to have 
given more thought to the relation between practical wisdom and the other virtues 
than to that between those other virtues themselves. For the natural implication, at 
least, of the words "where one is first, another second" (128.12-13) is that we are 
dealing with a complete series, so that there is also a third and a fourth. But how 
are we then to decide which of the virtues other than practical wisdom comes 
second, which third, and so on? It may indeed be that this point should not be 
pressed, and we are dealing not with an ordered series but just with a case of focal 
meaning, which does not for Aristotle involve the placing of every derivative item 
in a precise sequence. Then however the question arises, is this first solution 
actually meant to answer the first horn of the dilemma and to show that virtue can 
in some sense be a genus? For while there is evidence for Alexander holding that 
there can be a genus whose members form an ordered series (46), our text rightly 
describes what is said aph’ henos or pros hen as ambiguous (pollakhos legomena), 
and the definition of a genus has to apply to all its members in the same sense. 
It may be relevant that there is some reason to think that, where discussions 
attributed to Alexander give alternative solutions, the last solution is the tacitly 
preferred one (47). For the second solution in Problem 8 answers the other horn of 
the dilemma, by claiming that the definition of virtue in general does not apply to 
the individual virtues, and that virtue can therefore after all be a whole of parts. 
The definition of virtue in general is given as "the best state of the whole rational 
soul": one may compare 155.13-19 at the start of argument (VII) in mantissa 18, 
where the point is made in an even stronger form, claiming that the individual 
virtues will not even be virtues, considered in themselves apart from the whole. As 
in argument (VII), "the whole rational soul" presumably includes both the rational 
part proper and the part obedient to reason, so that virtue as a whole will include 
both the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (and, no doubt, the other 
intellectual virtues not concerned with action) and also the moral virtues. But there 
is no explicit reference to practical wisdom in the second solution in Problem 8, 
and no indication that it has a special role in unifying the virtues. 
Problem 28, on the other hand, argues that the definition of the whole does apply 
to every part of a uniform whole, and that the virtues form such a whole, because 
complete or perfect (teleia) virtue involves possessing all the virtues in the same 
way; such a person is said to perform courageous or temperate acts depending on 
the particular subject-matter in each case. the natural or incomplete virtues 
(157.32) are each concerned with different things, and it is this that gives the 
impression that the virtues proper too are distinct; but in fact, when the virtues 
have been completed by being mixed with each other to produce a uniform whole, 
they are all, it is implied, involved in every virtuous action (157.32-158.2) (48). 
This, we may note, implies a unity of the virtues in a stronger sense than (3); 
whether it amounts to (1) or only to (2) will depend on whether it is nevertheless 
legitimate to claim that a particular action can be described as predominantly 
manifesting, for example, courage (49). 157.30-158.1 seems to imply otherwise:  
it seems that activity is with each one of them, when it is concerned with the 
things with which the being of incomplete and natural courage, say, is 
concerned. But [a person] does not act with [the proper virtue in question] alone 
in respect of those [actions] of which virtue is reasonably predicated in a single 
sense on account of such a mixture of things which are similar to one another 
(my emphasis) (50). 
The second sentence could be read as allowing that, although a person performing 
a truly courageous act does not act with courage alone but all the virtues, 
nevertheless his action is predominantly an instance of courageous action. But 
there is nothing in the text to require it, and the reference just before this passage to 
the combination of the virtues as a uniform whole argues against it. True, the text 
goes on to conclude that  
these indeed we call virtues in the proper sense (158.1-2: my emphasis) 
but the use of the plural here may just be a concession to ordinary — and 
Aristotelian — usage (51). Here too no reference is made to practical wisdom; 
indeed the term phronesis and its cognates appear nowhere in Ethical Problem 28. 
  
  
9. Two treatments of EN 6 from the Byzantine period may be briefly mentioned: 
the commentary by Eustratius (c. 1050-1120 A.D.) (52) and the anonymous 
paraphrase, composed at some date before 1366 A.D., dubiously attributed to an 
otherwise unknown Heliodorus of Prusa (53). I begin with the latter, because the 
issue it raises (like the work itself) is narrower in scope.  
The anonymous paraphrase of EN 1144b32-35 fails to bring out the issue of the 
interrelation between the virtues other than practical wisdom. In that respect it is 
reminiscent of arguments (VII) and (VIII) in mantissa 18. I translate first of all the 
text of Aristotle: 
But in this way one could also refute the argument by which someone might 
claim dialectically that the virtues are separated from each other, because the 
same person is not most well endowed by nature for all of them, and so will 
have acquired one already but not yet another. This is possible in the case of the 
natural virtues ... 
and then the anonymous paraphrase (CAG 19.2 133.34-40): 
From this one could also refute a certain opposing argument, if it were 
introduced. For it seems that it is possible for practical wisdom to be separated 
from moral virtue. For the same person is not well endowed by nature for all 
(virtues), in such a way as to be able to acquire all the moral virtues and 
practical wisdom together; so he will have acquired the one, but not yet the 
other. Well, this is possible in the case of the natural virtues ... 
In effect, an emphasis on the special role of practical wisdom has been introduced 
into the statement of the objection, with the consequence that the relation between 
the other moral virtues is less prominent in the discussion. 
A similar preoccupation is apparent in the much fuller discussion of Eustratius, 
who shows a concern with the relative ranking of practical wisdom and moral 
virtue already in his discussion of 1144b13-17 (at 399.36-400.21), giving pride of 
place to the former. Unlike the author of the anonymous paraphrase, Eustratius 
correctly understands the statement of the objection, in 1144b32-35, as concerned 
with the relation between the virtues generally, rather than specifically with that 
between practical wisdom and the other virtues (CAG 20 403.31-35); and he 
expands Aristotle’s statement of the role of practical wisdom in the solution 
(1145a1-2) in the light of 1145a4-6: 
And in this way necessarily all (the virtues) will reciprocally accompany each 
other, the moral (virtues) proposing ends that are good, and practical wisdom 
finding the things that lead to these. (CAG 20 404.16-18) 
But then, when he comes to the statement at 1145a2-4 that practical wisdom would 
be required as a part of virtue in its own right even if it did not have this special 
relation with the other virtues, he argues not just that it is a virtue in its own right 
but that it is superior to the others: 
But (practical wisdom) will not on this account be second and some servant to 
(the goals and ends) (54), since it will also be independent (autoteles). For it 
would be needed even if it did not contribute to actions, because it is the virtue 
of a part of the soul, namely the reasoning part. So practical wisdom is also 
superior to the moral virtues, since it is the virtue of a superior part. For the 
reasoning part is superior to the spirited and desiring (parts), to which the moral 
virtues belong (CAG 20 404.28-33) (55). 
  
  
10. The arguments we have surveyed have been of different types with different 
consequences. Aristotle’s own argument for the mutual implication of the virtues 
turns on the distinction between natural virtues and virtue proper, and the claim 
that practical wisdom is required for every virtue in the latter sense. Whether 
Aristotle is arguing just for the mutual implication of the virtues, or for their unity 
in the stronger sense (2), is not entirely clear. Argument (IX) in mantissa 18 echoes 
Aristotle’s argument (XI), and Ethical Problem 22, reinforce this by connecting 
with it the point that practical wisdom implies knowledge of the goal, which in 
Aristotle is not explicitly part of the argument for the mutual implication of the 
virtues but immediately follows it. Arguments (V) and (VI) in mantissa 18, by 
emphasising the unity of what is noble as the goal of all virtuous action, seem to 
imply the unity of virtue in sense (2). So too do argument (VII) in mantissa 18 and 
the second solution in Ethical Problem 8, by regarding virtue as a whole of 
differentiated parts, and Ethical Problem 28, by regarding it as a whole of uniform 
parts; and (II) and (III), which appeal to linguistic usage. On the other hand 
argument (I) in mantissa 18, turning on empirical cases where the lack of one 
virtue hinders the operation of another, and argument (IV), concerned with the 
implications of the relation of individual virtues and vices to happiness, seem on 
the face of it at least (56) to argue only for the mutual implication of the virtues (3).  
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the Megarian school; cf. Diogenes Laertius 2.106 and 7.161, with C.H. Kahn, 
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